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Abstract: The idea that an adequate language for science needs a negation
operator was recently dismissed by Kripke as “yet another dogma of empiri-
cism”. That a scientist could, and even should, drop negation implies at least
three points: 1. negativist theories, i.e., theories formulated in languages that
include negation, are conservative extensions of their affirmativist versions;
2. negativist theories have no serious advantages over their affirmativist ver-
sions; 3. negativist theories are dispensable and should better be replaced by
their affirmativist versions. We argue that all three points are problematic.
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1 Introduction
Kripke (2015) argues that an affirmativist language is adequate for science:
“In strictly scientific discourse, or serious discourse generally, limning the
true and ultimate nature of reality, restriction to affirmativist terminology is
the way to go” (p. 384). So if you’re a scientist you could, and even should,
drop negation. This implies that, in science, negativist theories are conser-
vative extensions of their affirmativist versions, have no serious advantages
over their affirmativist versions, and are actually dispensable and so better
replaced by their their affirmativist versions. But we think that all these three
points are problematic. We will take them in turn.1
We point out, first, that negativist theories can be conservative extensions
of their affirmativist version provided that one takes the notion of logical
complement as an affirmativist notion. Secondly, we describe what Kripke
1We should note that, in an Addendum to his paper, Kripke confessed that it is rather a
“parody” of some of Quine’s own arguments, but also that he cannot deny that his argument
is sound, since he would thereby be lapsing into a negativistic idiom. Parody or not, suppose
that we take Kripke’s paper seriously. Then our discussion below entails that one should either
reject his argument or dismiss this supposition.
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took the practical advantages of affirmativist theories to be, and then con-
sider the view that an epistemic advantage of negativist theories is that they
are simpler than their affirmativist versions: the simplifying effects of clas-
sical negation are analogous to those of imaginary numbers in mathematics.
But we emphasize that while in mathematics such effects might be explained
in terms of categoricity, classical logic is non-categorical, for it admits of
non-normal interpretations. We also prove that eliminating negation does
not help one get rid of such interpretations: positive (and affirmativist) logic
is non-categorical as well. Finally, we argue that affirmativist restrictions on
science are at odds with the typical understanding of scientific idealization.
2 Is T− a conservative extension of T+?
Let’s start with Kripke’s argument for the claim that negativist theories are
conservative extensions of their affirmativist versions. Consider the affirma-
tivist first order language, L+, of an affirmativist theory, T+. L+ contains
a finite list of primitive predicates, conjunction and disjunction as primitive
connectives, and the universal and existential quantifiers. Is L+ adequate
for science?
Let us assume that L+ is adequate only if negation is added. By De
Morgan Laws, every sentence in the augmented language, L−, is logically
equivalent to a sentence with negation applied only to atomic formulae. Let
us eliminate negation and extend L+ by adding to each predicate Pi a pred-
icate P∗i for its complement, and likewise for any atomic sentence. Thus,
everything expressible in L− is expressible in the affirmativist language thus
supplemented, L∗+.
Kripke admits that the notion of complement is negativistic, but claims
that this is not a problem since the argument just given is directed at neg-
ativists, not affirmativists. This argumentative move is adopted by Kripke
from Quine (1960), where mentalist terms are employed in explaining to
mentalists the physicalist view about the mind. Using negativist notions in
Kripke’s affirmativist argument directed at negativists is analogous to using
mentalist notions in Quine’s physicalist argument directed at mentalists. Be
that as it may, if the notion of complement is negativistic, then how can L∗+
be counted as an affirmativist language? Kripke’s argument for the idea that
negativistic theories are conservative extensions of their affirmativist ver-
sions goes through only if one assumes that the notion of complement is an
affirmativist one. But in many logical systems, especially algebraic logical
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systems, the complement is precisely the notion that expresses negation.2
We should further note that, unlike classical positive logic, Kripke’s affir-
mativist logic does not have a classical semantics: it eliminates not only the
negation operator, but also the notion of “falsity”. A conjunction pA ∧ Bq
is true if and only if A is true and B is true, and a disjunction pA ∨ Bq is
true if and only if A is true or B is true. However, if the normal truth tables
(NTTs) for conjunction and disjunction contain only the first line3, then we
cannot really distinguish conjunction from disjunction, since only the other
three lines of the NTTs allow us to make a distinction between conjunction
and disjunction. Why would “and” and “or” mean different things for the
affirmativist?
But even if the affirmativist could distinguish between “and” and “or”,
the class of logical rules of inference and of logical truths of affirmativist
logic is drastically affected. For instance, pA → (B → A)q could no
longer be treated as a logical truth, since the material conditional is defined
only on the first line of the NTT and thus, without knowing the value of B,
we may be reluctant to accept pB → Aq, and thus pA→ (B → A)q.
3 Negation as an ideal element
What might be the advantages of affirmativist theories? Kripke claims that
affirmativism is more advantageous than negativism, because it improves
the civility of our debates, for example. If you thought that by eliminat-
ing negation, you would not be able to say anymore that the negation of a
true statement is false, Kripke would say that you should never state “Your
opinion is false!” in the first place. Instead, what you should say is “I am re-
luctant to accept your view”. He thinks that this may lead, in the long run, to
world peace. No argument is given for this claim, other than the observation
that many conflicts have been preceded by negativistic characterizations of
one’s opponents’ assertions as “false”. Kripke also thinks that affirmativism
offers a solution to paradoxes, since he thinks that all of them are easily seen
2As a matter of logical fact, the negation operation could not be defined with the help of
other sentential operations. This is why classical positive logic, i.e., classical logic without the
negation operator but with classical semantics, is incomplete – logical truths such as Peirce’s
Law cannot be derived without negation.
3From Kripke’s remark on this matter, it is natural to suppose so. He explicitly states that we
do not need the third extra lines from the truth-table for conjunction, the first line is sufficient.
This would suggest that the lines that contain the sign for falsity should be dismissed. If Kripke
introduced a sign for the attitude of reluctance to replace the sign for falsity, then, of course,
the propositional operators could be easily defined and distinguished one from another.
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to invoke a negativistic notion. More precisely, without negation, paradoxes
would just “disappear”. However, it is not clear that this is the case. As
Skolem (1952) proved, Dedekind’s naive set theory still leads to inconsis-
tency via the comprehension axiom, even if the logic used in the background
is positive predicate calculus (i.e., first-order logic without negation; see also
Hilbert & Bernays, 1934/1968).
Furthermore, imposing affirmativist restrictions in science assumes that
the alleged practical advantages of affirmativism (e.g., less conflicts, peace,
etc.) outweigh any other advantages negativist theories might have. But
there is a long tradition in the philosophy of logic, stemming from Hilbert’s
school, which considers negation as an idealization: “Negation plays the
role of an ideal element whose introduction aims at rounding off the logi-
cal system to a totality with a simpler structure, just as the system of real
numbers is extended to a more perspicuous totality by the introduction of
imaginary numbers.” (Bernays, 1927). Negativist theories, it is claimed
here, are simpler than their affirmativist versions. For example, the simpli-
fying effects of classical negation are comparable to the simplifying effects
of the imaginaries, and so eliminating negation is comparable to the elimi-
nation of the imaginaries from mathematics. Extending a logical system by
adding connectives, like negation, leads to a totality with a simpler structure.
As Hilbert also emphasized, negation makes possible the logical closure and
completeness of a system (see, e.g., Hilbert, 1931).
This view raises some important questions. Let’s assume that extending
a number system by adding new objects leads to a more perspicuous total-
ity. In particular, adding imaginary numbers to the reals forms the algebraic
closure of the real numbers, but what makes an algebraic closure a more
perspicuous totality? One answer to this question might be given in seman-
tic terms like categoricity: the algebraic closure of the real number field is
unique up to isomorphism (Steinitz, 1910). But what makes a closed and
complete logical system a totality with a simpler structure? Could a similar
answer be given in terms of categoricity?
4 The non-categoricity of classical logic
Let a semantic property of an expression be fully formalized by a calculus
if and only if the expression possesses that property in every interpretation
for which the calculus is sound. As is well known, however, classical logic
allows for non-standard models, i.e., interpretations for which the standard
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calculi remain sound and complete, but in which the logical constants have
different meanings than the standard ones (Carnap, 1943). The existence of
these interpretations shows that the standard propositional and quantifica-
tional calculi do not fully formalize all the semantic properties of the logical
terms and, thus, fail in uniquely determining their meanings. The rules for
negation, disjunction, material implication, and the quantifiers, in contrast to
the rules for conjunction, do not determine all the properties of these opera-
tors as defined by their normal truth tables (NTT) and the standard semantics
for quantifiers.
In propositional logic, non-normal interpretations are possible because
the usual formalizations of classical logic state conditions only for logical
derivability (C-implicate, in Carnap’s terms) and logical theoremhood (C-
truth). Thus, they can formalize only those semantic properties definable on
the basis of logical consequence (L-implicate) and logical truth (L-truth).
However, the semantic properties of L-exclusive and L-disjunct are not de-
finable on this basis, thus, they are not formalized by the usual systems. Two
sentences are L-exclusive if and only if they are not both true (thus, at least
one is false), and two sentences are L-disjunct if and only if at least one of
them is true (thus, they are not both false). Since L-exclusive and L-disjunct
are not fully formalized, the principles of non-contradiction and excluded
middle are not represented in the usual formalizations of classical logic.
There are two mutually exclusive types of non-normal interpretations for
classical propositional operators: (I) all sentences are true, and (II) at least
one sentence is false. Thus, there are non-normal interpretations in which
a sentence and its negation are both true, and non-normal interpretations in
which they are both false (and so, their disjunction is true and their implica-
tion is false). In type (I) interpretations, the principle of non-contradiction
is violated; in type (II), the principle of excluded middle is violated. Thus,
these two principles are not fully formalized, since they hold in some inter-
pretations (i.e., in the normal interpretations), but they do not hold in others
(i.e., in the non-normal interpretations). In addition, even if all propositional
operators had only normal interpretations, there would still exist non-normal
interpretations of the quantifiers (as shown in Carnap 1943, chapter F). In
particular, there are sound interpretations of quantificational logic in which
“(∀x)Fx” could be interpreted as “every individual is F, and b is G”, where
“b” is an individual constant. Likewise, “(∃x)Fx” could be interpreted as
“at least one individual is F, or b is G”. The possibility of these non-normal
interpretations arises because, in the standard formalizations of first-order
logic, a universal sentence is not deductively equivalent (C-equivalent, in
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Carnap’s terms) to the conjunction of all the instances of the operand, and
an existential sentence is not C-equivalent with the disjunction of all the in-
stances of the operand. The existence of such interpretations shows that the
logical calculus fails in uniquely determining the meaning of logical terms.
Unlike the rules for conjunction, those for negation (as well as those for dis-
junction, implication, and quantifiers) do not determine all the properties of
these operators as defined by NTTs and standard semantics.
Kripke took Carnap (1943) as an illustration of a negativistic theory, as
it includes not only rules of theoremhood, but also rules of rejection, and
he thought that discussing it in more detail would be “superfluous”. But we
think that it is important to note that Carnap proved that if negation has a
standard interpretation, then all other operators have a standard interpreta-
tion. Thus, the categoricity of negativist theories like classical logic would
require the elimination of non-standard interpretations of negation. The af-
firmativist could point out that if one eliminates negation, its non-standard
interpretations are thereby eliminated as well. This seems natural enough
since the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle do not be-
long to positive logic. This would suggest a shorter, if more radical, route to
categoricity.
However, this assumes that a positive version of classical logic does
not allow for non-normal interpretations. A closer investigation, however,
shows that the elimination of negation does not immediately entail that pos-
itive logic admits of no non-normal interpretations. The normality of nega-
tion constrains disjunction (and, thus, all the other operators) to be normal
only if negation is, of course, part of the system. If negation has a standard
interpretation, then disjunction has a standard interpretation. This is due to
the Disjunctive Syllogism (DS): A ∨ B,¬A ` B. If A and B would be
false, and negation is standard (thus, p¬Aq is true), then pA∨Bq cannot be
true, otherwise the rule would be unsound. However, we do not have the DS
in positive logic. In the absence of negation, what happens to disjunction?
As we shall see in a moment, in positive logic, A and B can be false, but
pA ∨Bq true.
5 The non-categoricity of positive logic
The semantic property of disjunction displayed on line D4 of its NTT is not
determined by the deduction rules for disjunction. Let us analyze what hap-
pens when D4 is violated, that is, what kind of non-normal interpretation
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would result from this violation, and then let us check whether this inter-
pretation is non-empty. Let us assume that D4 is violated with respect to
the propositional constants A and B. On this assumption, we can reason as
follows:
a) A is false, B is false, and pA ∨Bq is true. (by assumption)
b) A is different from B (and conversely). Proof: If A were B, then A,
which is derivable from pA ∨ Aq, would be derivable from pA ∨ Bq
and, thus, true. But A is false. Thus, A is different from B.
c) Any sentence derivable both from A and from B is true. Proof: If
a sentence is derivable both from A and from B, then it is derivable
from pA ∨Bq, and, thus, true.
d) A does not follow from B, nor B from A. Proof: If A were derivable
from B, since it is derivable from itself, it would be derivable from
A ∨B and, thus, true. But A is false.
e) pA → Bq is false. Proof: A ∨ B ` ((A → B) → B). Thus
p(A → B) → Bq is true. Since B is false, then according to line I4
in the NTT, pA → Bq has to be false. But since A is false as well,
then I4 is violated with respect to A and B.
Thus, we can see that the violation of D4 would lead to a non-normal in-
terpretation of the positive calculus in which the truth value of pA → Bq
on line I4 in the NTT is not determined by the rules of material implication,
since this operator is non-extensional, i.e., it behaves normally in its main
occurrence in p(A → B) → Bq, but non-normally in pA → Bq. What
we have to examine now is whether the non-normal interpretation with the
features just sketched is non-empty. That, indeed, it is non-empty will be
shown by the construction of an example, namely, the construction of an
interpretation, V+, as follows:
1. if p is a theorem of the positive calculus, then V+(p) is true.
2. if p is not a theorem of the positive calculus, then V+(p) is false, but
in the following two cases:
(a) V+(A ∨B) is true.
(b) For every C, if A ∨B ` C, then V+(C) is true.
This interpretation assigns ‘truth’ to every theorem of positive calculus and
‘false’ to every non-theorem of the positive calculus, except in the two cases
described: namely, it will assign ‘truth’ to pA ∨ Bq and to all formulas
derivable from it. Thus, since it assigns a determinate truth value to all
formulas of positive logic, V+ is a full interpretation of the positive calculus.
What we have to show now is that the positive calculus remains sound
under this interpretation.
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Proof: Let Γ be a set of premises and σ an arbitrary sentence in the
language of positive calculus, and let us further suppose that Γ ` σ. There
are three cases to be considered:
1. if in Γ we have only theorems, then σ will be a theorem and, thus,
true in V+.
2. if in Γ we have a non-theorem different from pA ∨ Bq and from any
C derivable from pA∨Bq, then the sequent Γ ` σ will be valid even
if σ is false.
3. if Γ contains a set of theorems (∆) and, in addition, it contains a non-
theorem which is either pA ∨Bq, or any C derivable from pA ∨Bq,
then σ either follows from ∆, and thus it is true, or it follows from
pA ∨Bq, and thus it is also true.
Therefore, the calculus of positive logic remains sound in the interpreta-
tion V+. However, as constructed, this interpretation is non-normal, since it
makes a disjunction true, although both of its disjuncts are false. What this
shows is that the existence of non-normal interpretations of a logical cal-
culus does not require the non-normality of logical negation. Even without
negation, the rules for disjunction do not completely determine the semantic
properties of disjunction as defined by its NTT. In addition, since positive
quantificational logic is obtained by adding the standard rules for the exis-
tential and universal quantifiers to the positive fragment of classical logic, it
is in no different position than classical quantificational logic with respect to
non-normality: the non-normal interpretations of the quantifiers in classical
logic are also present in the case of positive quantificational logic.
Furthermore, things are similar in affirmativist logic, because the elimi-
nation rule for disjunction involves no negation, and it is responsible for the
non-standard models for disjunction. More exactly, in affirmativist logic,
one may take a disjunction to be true, although one may be reluctant to ac-
cept its disjuncts. Therefore, the elimination of negation and falsity does not
entail that there are no non-standard interpretations.
To take stock, we have argued that negativist theories may be conser-
vative extensions of their affirmativist versions, but only if the notion of
logical complement is accepted as an affirmativist notion, and that these
affirmativist versions may have important practical advantages in that they
may be less conflictual and more civil, but that one should not overlook
some important epistemic advantages of negativist theories, e.g., simplicity.
We have also pointed out that negativist theories do not obstruct purported
semantic advantages of their affirmativist versions: since positive and affir-
mativist logics are non-categorical, one cannot maintain that categoricity is
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lost due to the addition of the negation operator. Thus, the affirmativist’s
elimination of negation cannot be justified on such semantic grounds.
6 Affirmativism and idealization
Let’s further suppose that one has strong enough reasons to prefer practical
to epistemic advantages, and so let’s suppose that one accepts the affirma-
tivist restrictions on science. Consider again imaginary numbers and their
simplifying effects. The latter could also be explained in terms of linear fac-
torization, i.e., via the fact that the only irreducible polynomials are those
of degree one. This is stated by the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra: “ev-
ery equation of degree n has n roots”. The theorem is, of course, false in
the real number system, but true in its algebraic closure, i.e., in the com-
plex number system. According to the affirmativist, however, one should
not say that the theorem is false in the real number system, since falsity has
been eliminated, but only that one is reluctant to accept the theorem in the
real number system. Analogously, one should not say that, for instance, the
ideal gas law is false for real gases, but only that one is reluctant to accept
it. More generally, one should not say that an idealized statement is false
for non-idealized systems, but only that one is reluctant to accept that state-
ment. However, this is entirely missing the point of scientific idealization.
In science, idealized statements are typically rather unreluctantly accepted,
for even though they are false for non-idealized systems, they are thought to
have great explanatory power (Toader, 2015).
In conclusion, pace Kripke, we argued that an affirmativist first order
language, L+, cannot be adequate for science. We believe that if Kripke’s
affirmativist view is taken seriously, then our argument entails that his view
should be rejected. More precisely, our argument entails that L+ cannot be
taken as the object language of a genuine scientific theory. But this leaves
other questions open. Could L+ be adequate as a metalanguage for science,
i.e., as the language of the metatheory of a scientific theory? In response
to this, we would like just to note here a recent effort to do model theory
in the framework of positive logic: “a non first order analogue of classical
model theory where compactness is kept at the expense of negation” (Ben-
Yaacov, 2003). Such an approach has been taken, for instance, to the formal
semantics of quantum mechanics (see, e.g., Zilber, 2016). But we are fine,
for the time being, with a negationless metatheory.
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